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“This book constitutes an examination of, and a contribution to, a discus-
sion conducted within the Catholic theological community since the 1960s 
concerning the proper understanding of the apparent interval between 
the death of individual human beings and the final consummation of all 
created things (typically referred to as the ‘intermediate state’)” (1). So 
begins Stephen Yates’s defense of the traditional Roman Catholic view of 
the intermediate state and critical analysis of rival views that focus on im-
mediate resurrection. I’m not aware of any other book-length treatment of 
the intermediate state and immediate resurrection that draws on Catholic 
and Protestant theological and philosophical traditions with such equal 
ease. Yates’s book is insightful and wonderfully honest, making clear just 
how difficult it is to hold to the traditional view, while also developing 
promising avenues of response. Regardless of whether one agrees with 
Yates’s judgment in particular cases (I often did not) or the overall position 
he reaches (I do not), philosophers and theologians of both Catholic and 
Protestant orientations will benefit from this patient and detailed critical 
study.
Chapter 1 introduces the reader to the traditional Catholic view of the 
intermediate state, what Yates calls “the traditional schema,” as well as 
its two main nontraditional rivals. According to the traditional schema, 
immediately upon death one’s soul is ushered into the presence of God, 
where the person is judged and either rewarded with entrance to heaven 
(either immediately or after purification in Purgatory) or punished with 
condemnation to hell, and—regardless of one’s eternal destiny—one is 
reunited with his or her body in the general resurrection at Christ’s Parou-
sia (1–2). As this very brief summary makes clear, the traditional schema 
involves several central commitments, including commitments to a two-
staged eschatology, wherein souls are immediately judged after death and 
their bodies are raised in the general resurrection, and a dualistic personal 
ontology that permits separated souls (animae separatae). It also assumes 
that human persons persist through death into the intermediate state and 
that the resurrected body is numerically identical to the living pre-mortem 
body that perishes (2–3).
For a variety of philosophical and theological reasons, the traditional 
schema has come under increasing fire from Catholic philosophers and 
theologians. Not only is it arguably inconsistent with the theological 




anthropology of sacred scripture, which seems decidedly monistic, it also 
threatens to undermine the substantial unity of human persons and is in 
tension with the centrality of bodily resurrection in the eschatological vi-
sion of the Church (6). Motivated by worries such as these, some Catho-
lic theologians have explored one or another version of the immediate 
resurrection hypothesis (what Yates typically refers to as “resurrection in 
death”). According to the first of these, atemporalism, at death human per-
sons pass “‘from time into a timeless eternity, in which the resurrection 
has already taken place.’ Death, in other words, leads into the Parousia 
and the last day” (8). On the other hand, for nonatemporalism, the second 
version of immediate resurrection Yates considers, at death human per-
sons are immediately resurrected into the intermediate state where, as 
fully embodied persons, they are judged and then rewarded or punished, 
and await the general resurrection (8), where the general resurrection is 
here understood as transforming an embodied individual in a way that 
completes or enhances her bodily existence (13).
Yates’s analysis of the current state of the debate reveals numerous dia-
lectical lacunae around which he structures the remaining chapters. In so 
doing, he seeks to move the debate forward and in this he is largely suc-
cessful (I say this as a still unrepentant opponent of the traditional schema). 
In chapter 2, Yates examines the scriptural evidence for and against the 
traditional schema. In chapters 3 and 4, Yates carefully examines and cri-
tiques atemporalism and nonatemporalism, respectively, and, finally, in 
chapter 5, Yates offers a comprehensive defense of the traditional schema.
Chapter 2 begins with John Cooper’s now standard distinctions between 
holistic and monistic anthropologies and two forms of holism, functional 
and ontological (34). Following Cooper, Yates argues that sacred scripture 
testifies to a dualistic form of functional holism, and not monism, focus-
ing first on Hebrew Scripture (Old Testament), then on the Deutero and 
non-canonical literature of the Second Temple period, and finally on the 
New Testament literature. To those familiar with the exegetical arguments 
developed by Cooper, G. E. Ladd, and Robert Gundry, there is little here 
that will surprise the reader. The real highlight of this chapter is Yates’s 
very close examination of 2 Corinthians 5: 1–10, a text often used by pro-
ponents of immediate resurrection to co-opt Paul as an ally. While such 
folks may not be wholly convinced by Yates’s exegesis, they cannot ignore 
this important contribution to the debate.
I have two concerns with this chapter that go beyond mere quibbles 
and exegetical disagreement. Yates seems to assume that the Hebrew 
scriptures (as well as the later Jewish and New Testament texts) speak 
with a single voice on matters of theological anthropology. Yet given the 
remarkable diversity of thought and seemingly irreconcilable points of 
view preserved in the Hebrew Bible on numerous issues central to Israelite 
(and, later, to Judean) religious life, practice, and theology, it would be 
surprising were it to convey a single, unified eschatological vision of per-
sonal and collective destiny. Second, for far too long, Christians (myself 
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included) have relied almost exclusively on the same narrow range of 
Protestant biblical scholarship on the anthropological and eschatological 
views of the Hebrew Bible and early Judaism. This narrow exclusivity 
comes at the cost of marginalizing the amazing work being done by Jew-
ish biblical scholars on these issues. Failing to include Jewish scholars in 
discussions regarding their sacred scripture and early theological views is 
no less problematic than convening an all-male panel to explain women’s 
views on their own healthcare. To rectify this problem one could do worse 
than by starting with Jon Levenson’s Resurrection and the Restoration of Is-
rael (Yale University Press, 2006).
Yates turns to an examination of atemporalism in chapter 3. According 
to this version of the immediate resurrection hypothesis, at death, human 
persons are immediately resurrected into the atemporal reality of the 
last day, “a timeless eternity which is beyond yet adjacent to time and in 
which Parousia, resurrection, last judgment, and cosmic consummation 
coincide” (88). Drawing on both philosophical and theological consider-
ations, Yates convincingly argues (to my mind, at least) that atemporalism 
offers an inadequate account of the intermediate state. Atemporalism is 
found to be problematic on philosophical grounds owing to, among other 
things, our having an essentially temporal nature that is inconsistent with 
being numerically identical to a person resurrected into atemporal reality. 
Theologically, atemporalism does no better as it threatens to undermine 
the eschatological significance of history, denying, as it does, that history 
culminates in the Parousia. Further, atemporalism stands in serious ten-
sion with Catholic faith and practice regarding those in Purgatory, for if 
at death a person immediately enters into the general resurrection on the 
last day, then there seems to be little logical or temporal space for the penal 
purification of Purgatory taught by the Magisterium and presupposed by 
the Church’s practices.
An especially delightful aspect of Yates’s discussion in this chapter is 
his examination of the metaphysical commitments of the Church’s prac-
tices and rituals. In drawing on the Congregation for the Doctrine of the 
Faith’s declaration that “The Church excludes every way of thinking or 
speaking that would make meaningless or unintelligible her prayers, 
her funeral rites and the religious acts offered for the dead” (114), Yates’s 
approach opens exciting new avenues of exploration that may offer us 
a way forward after what has too often felt like years of stagnation in in-
tractable debates. Just as positions in personal ontology can be usefully 
evaluated in light of their implications for philosophical theology (for ex-
ample, whether a materialist conception of human persons is consistent 
with the incarnation of the Son), so they may also be usefully evaluated 
in light of their implications for religious practices (for example, whether 
the Church’s practice of praying for the deceased necessitates a dualist 
conception of human persons).
Having found atemporalism inadequate, Yates turns, in chapter 4, 
to nonatemporalism, according to which at death human persons are 
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immediately resurrected into the intermediate state, from which temporal 
vantage point the consummation of all things on the Last Day is still yet 
to come (8). The nonatemporalist’s insistence on an embodied existence 
in the intermediate state raises the issue of how to adequately account for 
the numerical identity of the person whose corpse lies before us and the 
person who has risen into the intermediate state (127, 131–134). Chapter 
4 carefully examines the leading proposals from John Hick, R. T. Herbert, 
Charles Hartshorne, Hans Kung, Peter van Inwagen, Karl Rahner, and 
others, ultimately finding each of them unsatisfactory. The scope of analy-
sis in this chapter is impressive, the arguments are often compelling, and 
it nicely summarizes for Catholic philosophers and theologians an area of 
debate that’s too often dominated by their Protestant siblings.
With that said, I was left disappointed. Throughout this chapter, Yates 
relies heavily (though certainly not exclusively) on William Hasker’s dis-
cussion in The Emergent Self, and this is especially true of his discussion of 
Dean Zimmerman and Kevin Corcoran’s “fissioning” model of resurrec-
tion, according to which at death the human body undergoes fission in 
virtue of the particles composing it coming to stand in immanent causal 
relations with two successive sets of particles, one of which compose a 
terrestrial corpse and the other of which compose a living body in the in-
termediate state (163). Hasker objects to this model of resurrection on the 
grounds that it entails a closest-continuer account of personal identity and 
closest-continuer accounts of personal identity are, he argues, inconsistent 
with the necessity of identity, a cost that all parties would deem unac-
ceptably high. The problem is that both Zimmerman and Corcoran have 
provided detailed responses to Hasker that are not so much as mentioned 
by Yates, much less critically engaged. Granted, one may not like what 
Zimmerman and Corcoran say in response to Hasker, but in a book so cen-
trally structured around addressing dialectical lacunae, some of which are 
a matter of one side’s failing to address an objection or failing to address 
a reply to an objection made by the other side, it was disappointing to see 
the author merely repeat Hasker’s criticism with no further consideration 
of the matter. I have related worries regarding Yates’s discussion of the re-
lation between spatiotemporal continuity and the persistence of ordinary 
material objects (e.g., 139), but space precludes pursuing them here.
The inadequacy of immediate resurrection sets up Yates’s claim in chap-
ter 5 that only a personal ontology including separated souls is able to 
ground both a person’s continued existence in the intermediate state and 
the numerical identity of her living, pre-mortem body and her resurrec-
tion body (213). The main burden of the chapter is to address a cornucopia 
of objections to the traditional schema and here the book really shines. 
This is easily the strongest (as well as the longest) chapter of the book. In 
the first half, Yates addresses challenges to the traditional schema based 
on the seeming incoherence of a separated soul, the problem of individu-
ating separated souls, accounting for the possibility of a separated soul’s 
cognitive activity, and the trouble with securing a role for the separated 
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soul in personal identity. For the sake of space, I’ll focus on the last of 
these issues. Yates argues that the persistence of a separated soul is able to 
ground personal identity through death, disembodiment in the interme-
diate state, and resurrection by drawing on a notion of partial existence 
that allows him to deny that existence is “all or nothing” (201 ff.). Such a 
view, he argues, opens up the possibility of holding that while only a part 
of the person survives her death, it follows neither that the person ceases 
to exist full stop nor that the person experiences a break in continuity that 
would threaten the identification of the resurrected person with the per-
son who died.
This section of the chapter not only goes a long way toward resolving 
the tension between a Thomistic anthropology and human persistence 
through death and resurrection, it also presents an original and impor-
tant contribution to the dispute between survivalists and corruptionists 
and ought to be carefully considered by all parties to that debate. I only 
wish that Yates had engaged a wider range of scholars currently working 
on these issues. With a few exceptions (for example, Robert Pasnau, with 
whom Yates extensively interacts), Yates tends to engage only scholar-
ship that’s at least twenty years old. Yes, there are passing references to 
more recent work (Patrick Toner, Eleonore Stump, and John Madden are 
three examples), but many scholars who’ve made central contributions 
to the debate over Thomistic anthropology and post-mortem survival 
are entirely ignored. Certainly, as Yates notes (213), one cannot consider 
everything written on a given topic, but in what may well be a golden 
age of Thomistic scholarship, one would expect greater interaction with 
recent work. This is especially true with regard to Jeffrey Brower, David 
Oderberg, and Eleonore Stump, all of whom have offered philosophically 
sophisticated discussions connecting mereological considerations (of the 
sort relevant for Yates’s discussion) and disembodied survival.
In the second half of the chapter, Yates addresses a tension between the 
ontologically incomplete nature of the separated soul that experiences the 
beatific vision and the centrality of the resurrection of the body to Catho-
lic eschatology (215). In affirming that the separated soul experiences the 
beatific vision, it seems to follow that it experiences perfect beatitude (un-
derstood as perfectly complete joy or bliss) and, since perfect beatitude 
entails the satisfaction of all desires, it seems to follow that any increase in 
quantity or intensity of beatitude is impossible for separated souls expe-
riencing the beatific vision (235). The problem is that this conjunction of 
views is seemingly incompatible with the ontologically incomplete nature 
of the separated soul, for which union with its body would increase beati-
tude in some way.
To resolve this tension, Yates distinguishes between subjective and 
objective beatitude, the former being understood as a subjective experi-
ence of joy or bliss and the latter in terms of the glorification of the holy 
individual. This distinction enables Yates to accept the claim that being 
the subject of the beatific vision entails experiencing perfect beatitude, 
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understood subjectively, while rejecting that claim when understood ob-
jectively. Subjectively, a subject of the beatific vision cannot experience any 
increase or augmentation of beatitude; objectively, on the other hand, the 
subject’s beatitude (now understood as glory) can be increased through 
union with its body (236). I found this solution compelling and elegant, 
especially regarding its fit with the Church’s grand eschatological vision 
of the restoration and glorification of all creation on the Last Day.
Despite some minor weakness (some I’ve mentioned, others I’ve not), 
Stephen Yates has given readers a delightful and often compelling defense 
of the traditional Catholic view of the intermediate state and critique of its 
rivals. Any scholar working on these issues, Catholic or Protestant, should 
have Between Death and Resurrection on their shelf. 
